Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

11-1-1970

Governmental Support of an Advanced Civilian Technology Power Reactors and the Supersonic Transport
George Eads
Richard R. Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Eads, George and Nelson, Richard R., "Governmental Support of an Advanced Civilian Technology - Power
Reactors and the Supersonic Transport" (1970). Discussion Papers. 110.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/110

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

Center Discussion Paper No, 102
GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT OF ADVANCED CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY-POWER REACTORS
AND THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT
by

George Eads, Princeton University
and
Richard R. Nelson, Yale University

November, 1970

Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate
discussion and critical comment. References in publication s to Dis
cussion Papers should be cleared with the author to protect the ten
tative character of these papers.

GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT OF ADVANCED CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY--POWER REACTORS

AND THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT

George Eads
Richard R. Nelson

If present budgeting plans obtain, the Federal Government is committed
to spend well over $5 billion during the next decade on developing reactors
for civilian electrical power and supersonic transport aircraft for civilian
passengers.

Even in a trillion dollar GoN.P. economy, this is a lot of money

and these programs warrant a hard look for that reason alone.
discussion of the power reactor program has been quite limited.

Public
The considerable

controversy surrounding the continuation of the SST has been motivated to
a large degree by fears of the aircraft's effects on the environment.

It

does not appear to have been generally recognized that these two programs

may herald a significant de facto revision in the institutional structure
within which a considerable portion of American industry operates.*
This paper will develop and discuss the following characteristics of
these two programs.

First, they represent an almost unprecedented extent

and kind of governmental subsidy for the development of products for production
and sale by private companies through the market to the general public.
Second, in no sense can it be argued that there is a pressing "need" for
these new departures.

Rather, these programs were pushed to attention

at the Federal policy making level as technological opportunities that
*For one instance in which this point is recognized see: Albert Karr,
"Subsidy, Regulation, and Uncle Sugar," The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1970,
P• 12.
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"should" be exploited~

Further, the early advocacy of these programs came

largely from within Government, not from outside.

Thus the genesis, as

well as the nature, of these programs warrants a hard look for precedent.
Third, the arguments for the programs were and are that industry would not
undertake them rapidly or intensively enough without massive Governmental
aid.

Yet very little in the way of detailed persuasive analysis was, or

is being, presented as to why the conservative attitudes of private industry
~ere counter to the public interest.

Fourth, what we believe to be the implicit

rati~nale for the programs poses basic issues regarding the "standard ways
of doing things" in these industries.

Only the blind cannot forsee that

after the particular programs in question are completed there will be a next
generation of programs posing virtually the identical policy issues.

More

important, there will be projects in other technological fields presented
as candidates for this kind of subsidy.

The basic issues posed by these

programs involve the whole institutional structure..of ind·us.t'rii;il. R and, p,
including who proposes, who decides, and who funds and takes the risks.

The New Departure: Federal Subsidy for Development of New Products
for Production and Sale by Private Industry to the General Public
The programs of the Federal Government play a vast and vital role in
the research and development activities of the United States.

In 1969,

of a total national Rand D spending of roughly $26 billion, approximately
$17 billion were Federal funds.

The purposes of the public Rand D programs

were numerous and diverse, but for the most part can be placed in two

-

categorie s.*
sector.
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The first is the developme nt of new technolog y for the public

The dominant programs here, of course, are defense related, but

the Governmen t also undertake s or supports Rand D to improve the ability
of public agencies to protect the public health, guard against dangerous

drugs and medicines , support construct ion of public facilitie s like airports
and roads, improve air safety, etc.

In all of these cases the Government

is charged with performin g a particula r function and the Rand Dis under
taken to permit it to perform more efficient ly.

The second purpose is to

advance basic knowledge or knowledge of highly diverse interest or use.

Here

the basic research support programs of the NSF and NIH are clear examples,
Recently, of course, NASA has been a dramatic new departure in Government
sponsorsh ip of a scientifi c and technolog ical venture both for the intrinsic
interest of the adventure , and because of the belief that diffuse and
widesprea d benefits will be an important by-produ ct.
Governme ntal spending for both of these purposes has tradition s that
go back far into American history.

The Constitut ional responsib ility for

setting and maintaini ng standards for weights and measures soon led to a
small research effort in the Treasury Departmen t.
"Rand D" on a variety of weapons.

The army arsenals performed

Coast and Inland surveys and explorati ons

early were undertake n and financed to enable the army and the navy to protect
the country better, and because it was believed that the knowledge would
be of widesprea d interest and utility to the citizens.
But by and large the Federal Government has steered shy of supportin g
or undertaki ng Rand D aimed specifica lly at improving a particula r class
*For a more detailed discussio n see Richard Nelson, M. J. Peck,
E. D. Kalachek, Technolog y, Economic Growth, and Public Policy, Brookings , 1967,
Chapter 8.
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of products or services whose normal channel of distribution is through
the market.

Where this has been done, the product in question has had strong

claims to being a merit good, the quality of which "ought" to be improved
or cost reduced (like those connected with better health), or a large
fraction of the society was concerned with production of the product (as
the early rationale for public support of agricultural research), or the
product was closely linked with defense (as aviation).

There also are a few

examples of public Rand D support for specific industries (like coal)
that were believed to be "in distress".

But by and large in all of these

cases public funds tended to go into research and exploratory development,
with commercial development being left to private initiative.
The pre-1960 public support of research relevant to civil aviation
is directly relevant.

In 1915 the National Advisory Committee on Aeronau~

tics (NACA) was created to spur the development of American aviation.

During

its heyday during the 1920's and 1930's, NACA pioneered in the development
and operation of Rand D facilities for general use (wind tunnels, for example),
in information collection and dissemination, and in basic research and ex
ploratory development.

It undertook major work on aircraft streamlining,

design of engine parts, properties of fuels, and structural aspects of
aircraft design, and it built and tested a variety of experimental hardware.
But NACA did not directly support the development of particular commercial
airplanes.

Indeed, the idea that such a role should be assumed by the

Federal Government was explicitly rejected in the late 1940's when Congress
refused to approve bills that would have appropriated Federal funds to finance
the construction of a jet transport prototype in spite of claims that
private industry could not hope to raise the sums required and that U.S.
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leadership in commercial aviation would be surrendered to the British,
whose government was supporting prototype programs, unless such aid was
forthcoming .*
Until recently the programs of Atomic Energy Commission in support of
civilian power reactors were similar in spirit to the NACA support of aircraft
technology.* *

The ammanded Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established a more

or less explicit division of responsibil ity between the AEC and private
enterprise, with the Government' s role being limited to support of research,
the building of experimenta l reactors, the operation of facilities for testing,
information disseminati on, etc.

That private companies operated many of

the AEC laboratorie s and facilities, and that these clearly were and are
viewed as places where private companies and personnel could "learn" and
gain experience, departs from the NACA experience.

But private enterprise

clearly was left the job of bringing the technology into practice on its
own initiative.
1
During the late 1950's and throughout the 1960 s, the Atomic Energy

Commission gradually increased the extent of its involvement in the development
of civilian nuclear power, both in terms of detailed planning and .s.ubs.:i,dy
of development , and in terms of admonishing industry to do more than it
seemed to want to do.

Similarly, during this period the Federal program

in support of supersonic transport technology evolved from a traditional
*e.g., see "Costs and Jets, 11 editorial, American Aviation, June 1, 1948,
p. 1; and "U.S. Airlines to Buy Eritish?" Aviation Week, August 29, 1949, pp. 31-32.
**For a discussion see Philip Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power:
Economic Issues and Policy Formation, Twentieth Century Fund, 1963.

NACA type of effort to one of planning and financing final product development
and admonishing the industry to try harder,

These represent major new

devartures in the Government's role in Rand Don products produced by
private companies and distributed through the marketo

The Genesis:

Technology Opportunity Push from Inside the Government

The obvious question is what triggered the significant new departures.
Both conventional wisdom and relatively careful research would suggest that
major new Governmental policies usually stem from perception of a pressing
problem, or pressure from a politically potent external interest group, or
both.

But for these programs this does not seem to have been the case.
In most of the more recent studies of policy making (more generally

decision making in large organizations), new policy departures or major
policy modifications have been described as usually coming about as a result
of perceived problems with the status quo ante.

While it sometimes is not

fully clear what comprises a "problem," the use of the word suggests something
different than simply a perceived opportunity to do better.

What is interesting

about the two cases in question is that they do not fit this mold.

There

was no pressing problem or need to call forth the escalation of public
policy in civilian power reactors or civil aviation.

Rather the programs

evolved as they did largely on the grounds that an opportunity existed
that was perceived as not being exploited fast or hard enough.
Up until just recently the electric power industry of the United States
certainly was not high on the list of those whose performance was widely
perceived as "unsatisfactory".

John Kendrick's study of Productivity
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Trends in the United States shows a long-run rate of productivity growth in
electric power more than three times the national average.

Relatedly the

price of electric power has fallen significantly over the years and the rise
in consumption has been very rapid.

Concern about growing scarcity of con

ventional fuels goes back at least as far as Jevons in the late 19th century
and such concern clearly was and is a prime factor in arguments for rapid
development of nuclear power.

But from the earliest analyses of nuclear

power studies generally have reached relatively sanguine conclusions regarding
short run energy supply adequacy, and have given no cause for alarm even
for the long run.

In their monumental study published in 1960, Schurr and

Netchert projected that coal reserves were ample in quantity and kind to
meet the demands at least to the end of the century without rising costs.*
They also projected sufficiency of natural gas reserves for the medium
run future.

They saw petroleum reserves as more problematical, but for the

purposes of generation of electricity, coal can be substituted for petroleum
without difficulty.

The 1966 study of Energy Rand D and National Progress,

which was undertaken with the express purpose of identifying sources of concern,
reached the conclusion that significant shortages of conventional fuels,
or sharply rising costs of extraction, were not likely in this century.**
Progress in civil aviation has been, of course, even more spectacular
than in electric power.

Successive generations of new aircraft have made

travel vastly faster and more comfortable, and prices of air travel (even
not counting the great quality improvements) have until recently fallen
*Sam Schurr and Bruce Netchert, Energy in the American Economy, Johns
Hopkins, 1960.
**Energy Rand D and National Progress, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
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relative to the average.

Indeed, at least one recent study has concluded that

the development of new aircraft perhaps has proceeded at too fast a rate,
with CAB rate control authority precluding effective price competition by
older planes to counter the speed advantages of the new, thus providing
an artificially profitable market for new high performance aircraft.* ·
Certainly the "problems" with respect to air transport, as they have increasingly
been perceived during the 1960's and 1970's, involve air space crowding and
safety, growing congestion to and from and at the airports, and noise;
problems not of a sort resolvable by a supersonic transport.
The statement that there was no perceived problem, at least in the short
and medium run, to which nuclear reactors and supersonic transports represented
a possible solution is a bit too strong.

There was and still is a felt

"need" to do something (preferably on the cheap) for the less developed
countries and, in the early days, nuclear power seemed such a possibility.
U.S. development of the supersonic transport was influenced powerfully by
a perceived "need" not to let other countries get ahead of us in civil aviation;
relatedly, there was concern about the balance of payments consequences
if this occurred.

But (as we shall discuss later) the case for the programs

on these grounds· :scarcely is powerful, and the major arguments were posed
in terms of "opportunities that ought to be seized."
Just as recent models of the policy process place limited weight on
"opportunity push", most views of governmental policy processes generally
ascribe policy changes to outside demands.

While increasingly attention is

being paid to the fact that governmental agencies and civil servants have
*William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and
Imperfections, especially Chapter 3, "Rivalry Through Service Quality."
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore (in press).
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wills of their own, for the most part this influence is viewed as conservative.
In the power reactor and supersonic cases, not only were the departures
apparently attempts to push opportunities rather than meet difficulties;
the pushing seems largely to have come from within government rather than
from the outside,
Advocacy of the electrical equipment producers and the private utilities
was an important factor behind the "freeing up" of nuclear information and
Rand D from the tight control of the AEC manifested in the AEC "industry
participation" program of 1951.*

The 1954 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act

explicitly established Governmental commitment to basic research, and
exploratory development of civilian atomic power was in part at least
responsive to industry and utility demands.

But, according to Mullenbach,

the equipment suppliers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, certainly cannot
be counted among the early enthusiasts for the growing Federal activism as
it evolved,

Neither the private utilities.

Indeed the private utilities

tended strongly to resist the building of Governmental reactors on sizeable
scale, fearing that this might strengthen the tendency for nuclear power
to go "public."

While there was less resistance on the part of the utilities

to governmental subsidy of private construction and ownership of large
experimental plants, in the early days this seems to have been more in the
spirit of "if you insist that we build, you will have to share the costs"
than of active advocacy.

Of course, as the equipment suppliers gradually

invested in their nuclear design and production capabilities they have grown in
creasingly enthusiastic about governmental programs to subsidize the procurement
of nuclear power,
*For a good history see Mullenbach.

- 10 -

But the early thrust appears to have come largely from within the AEC
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The major noted advocacy speeches

during the late 1950 1 s and early 1960's were by Commissioners and Congressmen.
They seem to have been the active force behind the gradual escalation of
subsidy from assistance in studying the projects (in the mid 1950's) to
paying a share of the capital costs (1960) to subsidizing reactor design
costs.

The most recent development is the proposed governmental committment

to the achievement of an economic breeder reactor by the 1980 1 s involving
explicitly AEC detailed planning, subsidation, and monitoring of large demon
stration plants for designs that are at least close to produceable and saleable.
Similarly the SST program seems to have been more the result of pushing
from within government than pressure from the outside.

The program appears

to have bubbled up as the result of a coalition between NACA (by the NASA)
people who had been researching aspects of supersonic flight in the traditional
NACA context, and people at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The early attitude of the airlines appears to have been that an SST was
inevitable but support for governmental subsidy of development was, at best,
guarded.

The manufacturers, naturally, were willing to proceed with development

of an SST under governmental funds, but the idea does not seem to have been
theirs.
The early conception of the program involved an unprecedented element of
direct governmental assistance in the development of a commercial aircraft,
but it was not argued at that time that Federal funding would have to play a
very major role.

As wi.th atomic energy, as the sixties progressed the extent

of governmental involvement and subsidy escalated.

The key events seem to

have been the demise of the B-70, which, it had been hoped, would provide
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considerable spillover assistance to the development of a commercial SST,
the British-French agreement to proceed with the Concorde, and the growing
awareness on the part of SST advocates that the manufacturer would not proceed
unless the subsidy was increased substantially.*

The Governmental committment

has grown from a $12 million feasibility study in 1961, to notions of Governmental
cost sharing of up to 50% of development costs through prototypes, to the
present level of 90% cost coverage by the Government, and the recent implicit
committment to carry the development through the post~prototype stages if
industry is reluctant.

The Lack of a Persuasive Explicit Rationale
That these programs are major new departures for Government involvement
in Rand D; that they represent attempts to seize "opportunities" rather than
reactions to "problems", 11;nd that the initiative came largely from within the
Government, are not, of course, reasons for condemnation.

Many students of

Governmental Rand D policies, including one of the authors, have called for
significant expansions in the Governmental role.

That Governmental policies

usually tend to be responsive to problems and not opportunities is a reason
for concern; such a bias in the policy-considering trigger is bound to be
non-optimal.
By and large the traditional Federal Rand D programs can be and have
*In this connection, see Testimony of Elwood Quesada, Former Administrator,
Federal Aviation Agency, in "Economic Analysis and Efficiency of Government,"
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic
Committee, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, part 4, Supersonic Transport Development,
PP• 925-927.
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been justified on the grounds that the decentralized market mechanism would
not generate the right kind of Rand D.

This is likely to be the case where

the public sector has preempted the market, as in defense and the postal
service.

For basic research support, the argument is that benefits are not

reflected adequately or at all in private profit opportunities.

In the

early days of agricultural research support, the argument was that farmers
were "too small" to do Rand D, and that there were many important problems
where seed and equipment suppliers had no financial interest.

There was

also a pervasive feeling, in contrast to the ideology with respect to
manufacturing, that agricultural advances should be a public good.
The reasons advanced for Federal support of prototype construction of a
nuclear power reactor and an SST have not been of these sorts.

Instead,

it has been argued that the traditional public programs--undertaking or financing
basic research, building and testing experimental hardware, providing research
and testing facilities--are not !ufficient by themselves to motivate private
industry to undertake advanced development soon enough or intensively enough
to achieve technological success in the near future.

The magnitude of the

funds required, the length of the development period, and the risks involved
are held to transcend the capabilities of existing capital markets and firms.
Very large financial requirements and a long lead time, combined with
considerable uncertainty about returns and costs, are indeed possible reasons
why some kind of public action (though not likely subsidy) might be in order,
if these were associated with a very high expected rate of return.

The

elasticity of capital supply to firms, their time horizons, and their ability
to spread risks, certainly can be stretched so far that profitable ventures
cannot be seized without some Federal action.

Having admitted this, however,
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we should not underestimate the ability of capital markets and firms today to
undertake ventures of bold size and risk, and a long time horizon.

IBM is

reported to have risked $5 billion in the early 1960's to develop the System/360
family of computers.

This sum is somewhat higher than the total estimated

cost of the SST program through delivery of the first aircraft.

It was

raised at a time when IBM's sales, total assets, and net worth were not
significantly larger than those of Boeing Aircraft today, to say nothing
of the combined assets of Boeing and General Electric, the two prime contractors
on the SST project.

Furthermore, many companies have shown a willingness

to support R and D on projects where it was anticipated that retvr,ns would be
quite distant and uncertain.

Even •in the late 1920's, the electrical companies

were undertaking Rand Don television, and Dupont was investigating high polymers.
The key reason why American industry has been unwilling to invest in
Rand Don power reactors and on the SST of a magnitude and kind that the
advocates think appropriate is that the expected rate of return is very low,
much below that of other uses of funds and resources.

Cost-benefit studies

by program advocates show this, even under what many outsiders regard as
rigged assumptions.

Were this not believed, both in the Government and outside,

much more consideration would have been given to Governmental assistance and
risk sharing, rather than to one form or another of subsidy.
The argument that public funds should be provided h~ rested largely
on the case that the private financial benefits understate the true benefits
to society, or that the private financial costs overstate the real costs,
or both.

In the controversy over the SST, for example, factors such as the

program's impact on the balance of payments, its effect on employment in the

- 14 aerospace and related industries, and, to a lesser degree, technological
spillovers alleged to be of value to the military have been advanced in support
of Federal prototype funding.*

Yet underlying these claims is a belief that

the most important externality is the assurance that the program's continuation
gives of continued U.S. dominance in the World commercial aircraft industry.
Commercial dominance is equated with technological superiority, and it is
claimed that failure to exploit the technology embodied in the SST at the
earliest possible moment will mean a loss of technological leadership, which
in turn will mean an irreversible loss of commercial position.
Such thinking apparently has its roots in the experience of the aircraft
industry in the production of military hardware.

In the past twenty-five

years the American aircraft industry has grown prosperous by producing military

designs which offer often marginal improvements in performance over existing
designs at substantially greater cost.

In military aviation sometimes

(but certainly not always) even a marginal technological advantage is the
difference between life and death.

Yet to apply such a development strategy

to a commercial product is to invite commercial disaster.

As Phillips states:

"While it is undoubtedly true that particular aircraft have been added to the
fleets [of the airlines] because of non-cost aspects of performance and because
of the influence of new equipment on passenger demand, the record over
the years is strong in suggesting that, absent favorable cost behavior, none
or only few of any new type of aircraft is demanded."**
*Albert Karr, "Clash Over the SST," The Wall Street Journal, September
23, 1970, p. 1.
**Almarin Phillips, Technological Change and the Market for Commercial
Aircraft (draft), pp. 138-139.
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That the United States has dominated the commercial aircraft market
in the postwar period is undeniable.

Recent estimates reveal that over

80 percent of the World's commercial airline fleet was built in this country.*
Phillips' research makes it clear, however, that this dominant commercial
position rests not so much upon the general technical superiority of U.S.
built commercial aircraft but instead upon the good record of the American
manufacturers in deciding when to embody what technological advances into
commercial products.

This record undoubtedly has been aided by the fact

that in each case, the decision to produce a commercial design has been made
by a private company risking its own funds.

There is no doubt, for example,

that if Congress had been willing to appropriate the necessary funds in 1948,
the U.S. and not the British could have been the first to introduce jet
transports into commercial service.

It is clear from a study of the designs

then being proposed, however, that the early U.S. jet transports would have
been no more commercially viable than was the Comet I or Cornet II.

And how

much would it have aided the reputation of the American commercial aircraft
industry had it, and not the British, been the one to discover the catastrophic
effects on pressurized aircraft of metal fatigue?
In contrast to the U.S. experience, the record of the British aircraft
industry in the postwar period has been relatively dismal.

The British

government has been prep~red to cover up to 50 percent of the costs of launching
civil aircraft designs and to assure a base market for these designs by
requiring British flag carriers to purchase the resulting product, regardless
*Statement of James }1. Beggs, Undersecretary of Transportation,
"Economic Analysis and Efficiency of Government," op. cit., p. 962.
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of operating costs.*

As a result the British have rung up a string of technologi

cal successes that, by and large, have been commercial failures.

Even the

massive infusion of Governmental aid has not served to maintain the health
of the British aircraft industry, and, with few exceptions, the aircraft
produced have not made a favorable contribution to Britain's balance of payments.**
While proceeding under forced draft from original idea to finished
product under the notion that a new technology must either be seized or
lost certainly does not contribute to, and may even hinder, the attainment
of a commercially successful product, it is nonetheless possible that such
an accelerated program may serve to allow society to reap any benefits asso
ciated with the attainment of a particular technology sooner rather than
later in time.

In the cases of both atomic energy and the supersonic transport,

it is apparent that the technology would be very valuable to have around,
if it were developed to anything close to its potentiala

In the hearings,

speeches, and dialogues the word "inevitable" has been used regarding both
of these technologies.

In the cost benefit studies of the breeder reactor

program a considerable amount was made of the fact that, given the large
and rapidly growing market for electric power, hastening the day that we
have breeder reactors that are superior economically to existing technologies,
will enable us to start our benefit flow earlier, and enhance the total benefits
we shall reap.

In the SST studies, although to a lesser extent, and more

*Robert E. Baldwin, Nontariff Distortions of International Trade.
Brookings, 1970, p. 119. This latter commitment alone was costing the British
government an estimated $80 million in subsidy to British European Airways in 1968.
**The relatively poor commercial performance of the Caravelle, an
aircraft ordered in prototype form by the French government in 1953 and which
first flew in 1955, is yet another example of the point being made. The
Caravelle anticipated the technology later embodied in the BAG 111 and DC-9
by almost ten years, yet this in itself was not enough to guarantee a market
for the aircraft,
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connected with the concern about the expansion of a particular competition
technology--the Concorde--, the same kinds of arguments for hastening the
inevitable are made, implicitly or explicitly.
However the very fact that these technologies, as they approach their
potential, will be valuable (and this is what makes them "inevitable") means
that one cannot compare the achievement of the technology under the proposed
program to accelerate development against the null alternative that it never
will be developed.
have seen.

Yet this is done in all of the cost benefit studies we

The very attractiveness of the technologies and their potential

profitability almost assure that even under the existing regime of private
and public institutions, they will ultimately be developed.

The key question

is timing and scheduling of effort, and overall Rand D strategy.
Common sense, history, and detailed analysis all tell us that there is
a time-cost trade off.*

Public subsidy or more direct programs can buy

us time, but we pay for speed.

The costs of hastened development must be

weighed against the benefits of gaining an attractive technology sooner.
While the formal cost benefit studies stress the benefits of faster achievement,
they either ignore or deny that we could achieve the same results more cheaply
if we didn't hurry so much.

But this is really the issue.

Why are the costs and risks too great in these programs for private
enterprise to bear?

Because at the targeted pace of development one cannot

proceed sequentially and in small bites.

The technological advances that

we have achieved in many industrial and product fields, largely through private
,'(For a discussion see Frederick M. Scherer, "Government Research
and Development Programs," in Robert Drofman (ed.), Measuring the Benefits
of Government Expenditures, Brookings, 1965.
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efforts, have been truly spectacular.

But the progress has been sequential,

and efforts to achieve major advances in technology, like the first jet
transports, and the recent jumbo jets, have been paced over time, with the
major product development efforts waiting until components were available,
until research findings had clarified many of the dark places, and until the
final expensive surge looked relatively certain and the returns high.
A case can be made that this strategy of Rand D implies that the long run
"profits" from the early exploratory and experimental work may tend to diffuse
away from the market grasp of private business firms; hence, some kind of
governmental programs may be needed to assure that this part of the process
is as intensively undertaken as the long run promise of the technology warrants.*
And such programs were in fact being undertaken by NACA for aviation, and by
the AEC in the field of power reactors, before the recent thrust to greater
haste.
The rationale for the current programs totally neglects that the problem
is one of time-cost trade off.
If these, why not others?

Why such special haste on these programs?

We have not seen good anewers to these questions;

indeed they do not appear to have been asked.
these technologies faster
at all)?

How much is it worth to get

(E.£! how much is it worth to get the technologies

How much is it costing us to speed up their achievement (not

how much is their development likely to cost under the proposed program)?
What will be the technological spillovers, balance of payments effects, and
employment effects of having these projects now rather than in the future and how
*See Nelson, Peck and Kalachek, Chapter 9,
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do these spillover effects compare with those associated with programs that
will not be undertaken due to our haste in these projects?*

We think that

if these quesitons were posed and valid answers obtained, few reasonable
men would advocate the SST or the nuclear power reactor programs as they are
presently constituted.
There are two deeper issues which we want to explore in the following
section.

One is the implication of these programs for institutional structure.

The other involves concern about the way the nation looks at technology.

Questions of lnstitutional Structure and the Role
of Science and Technology
If past experience be a guide, the conscious national decision to achieve
very high rates of technical progress in a particular field is tantamount to
a decision that traditional decentralized modes of Rand D organization,
decision making, and risk taking, be superceded by a much more concentrated
and centralized structure..

The Manhattan Project to develop the atomic

bomb, during World War II, probably was our first national experience with
extreme forced feeding of technological progress, and the project involved
and required not only large amounts of resources but also a quite elaborate
control and monitoring network.

During the post War era, and particularly

since the mid 1950's, the same kind of time urgency has marked much of military
Rand D.

Increasingly the military Rand D program has been concentrated

in a few large and ambitious projects, each one under (at least attempted)
*For a recognition of the relevance of these questions see: "The
SST Decision," editorial, The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1970, p. 14.
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tight control from the center and the overall "program" under increasingly
tight central monitoring.

Project Apollo, of course, is another example of

this Rand D style associated with an emphasis on speed or technology stretching
with little concern with the cost, and with detailed central planning.
The presently proposed reactor program and the SST represent the transference
of the Rand D style of the Manhattan Project, post 1950 military Rand D,
and the programs under NASA, to two new areas, with the objective of achieving
faster progress.

In these fields it is clear that the traditional division

of labor and responsibility now is or soon will become obsolete, unless there
is a radical reversal of policy.

The Federal government increasingly is adopting

the role of deciding in detail the Rand D projects that will be undertaken,
paying the bill and taking the risks, and being generally responsible for
the kinds of products and processes that evolve.
This clearly is so, and has received political sanction, in the civil
reactor field.

This is not to say that the AEC finances or undertakes all

of the work, although it does for a large share of it.

But the AEC does

monitor private effort and seeks to influence it, as well as directly con
trolling the publicly supported programs.

In the breeder reactor program

the AEC finally has gone to the length of specifying an overall development
plan in some detail, stating what the private sector should be doing as well
as the public.

We think it goes without saying that, unless some radical

rethinking occurs, this "plan" will be progressively updated, ultimately
will look to the generation of reactor technologies beyond the present breeders,
and represents the evolution of a long run way of doing things in civilian
reactor technology.
It is less apparent, but we think it true, that the SST program represents
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a very large permanent increase in governmental detailed responsibility for
Rand Din civil aviation, unless there is a change in policy.

Governmental

planning and programs, backed by funds, cannot help but drive out or greatly
reduce private planning and programs, if these governmental efforts carry
through development as is the new departure.

Financing, and detailed planning

of, final product development simply is very different in its impact on
private Rand D than support of basic research and exploratory development
as in the old NACA days.

Public funding of the early stages of the Rand D

process can be expected to ~pur private development spending by making clearer
the development options, and reducing the cost of the developments needed
to achieve a given performance enhancement.

But if the Government finances

development itself, private efforts are at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to the subsidized programs.

This is particularly so when, as appears

to be the case in civil aviation, the Governmentally backed efforts aim for
such major advances that competition is not possible unless there are
comp~n~able ,private funds in the development till.

Under the new precedent,

development of civil aviation is likely increasingly to follow the military
pattern, with government and industry jointly deciding what to develop
(with the Government bearing the lion's share of the cost and the risk),
rather than the traditional pattern of civil aviation development in the
United States.

At the least there will be a "hypersonic" development to

follow the supersonic development and already there is discussion of an
"overall development strategy" for civil aviation.
It is not a short step, it is a very large step, to a significant additional
expansion of the sectors to which this structure will be applied.

However

we think we already can see a significant expansion of Federal funding of,
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and planning of, medical development as well as research.

Here, as in atomic

energy and aviation, the key ingredients seem to be, first, a large and competent
group of scientist-technicians within the government and, second, a feeling
that the pace of technical progress in the field could be much faster.
Several additional directions of likely expansion, fueled by like conditions,
can be identified.

The Interdepartmental Study of Energy Rand D and National

Progress provided a long list of areas in which it was judged Rand D was
"promising" and governmental encouragement (subsidy?) possibly warranted; the
concentration of Federal largesse on atomic energy cannot continue for long.
Likewise there is growing concern about concentration of Federal funds for
transportation R and D on aviation, and it is a good bet that soon other
areas of transportation will b8gin to get more attention.

I
Perhaps most

striking, and most in need of watching, is the growing discussion of the pos
sibilities of tapping the R and D capabilities built up in private enterprise
through the defense and space programs (now the SST program) and the public
capabilities of the AEC laboratoTies for civil Rand D more broadly.
We are bothered by these institutional concomitants of a philosophy
that technological opportunities should be seized, and rapidly, and that a
leisurely pace of prhate development is a good reason for public forced
feeding, for two basic reasons.

The first is really a reflection of the

fact that these policies involve climbing far out along the time cost trade
off curve; this kind of Rand D institutional structure and strategy is likely
to be very inefficient as well as costlyo

Our second concern is that Governmental

commitments to particular technologies and products pose an unusually difficult
public control problem.
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One of the most striking aspects of the history of technological advance
in most American industries is the diversity of sources.

New products,

processes, inputs, and equipment for an industry have come from firms in the
industry, suppliers, purchasers, new entrants to the industry, outside individual
inventors.

The process certainly was not orderly and planned, and one has the

impression that had one tried to impose order and plan the result in many
(most?) cases would have been much worse.
to be very promising did not pan out.

Many developments that early seemed

Many important breakthroughs were

relatively unexpected and were not supported by the experts in the field.
While detailed case histories are not plentiful, and many of these do not shed
light on the question, one has the impression that in most of the technically
progressive industries, like chemicals and electronics, most of the bad bets
were rather quickly abandoned, particularly if someone else was coming up
with a better solution, and good new ideas generally had a variety of paths
to get their case heard.
Military Rand D programs since the mid 1950's, the civil reactor programs,
and experience to date with the supersonic transport are a sad contrast.
In these areas the early bet batting average has been dismal, just as it has
been in the domain of decentralized development.

But there has been a proclivity

to stick with the game plan, despite mounting evidence that it is not a good
one, that appears only in exceptional cases in areas where Rand Dis more
decentralized and competitive.

The case of Convair throwing good money after

bad on the 880 development rightly is regarded as an aberration, and the fact

that General Dynamics had learned its style in military Rand D undoubtedly
was a contributing factor..

But this kind of thing is the rule, not the
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exception, in military Rand D.

The B-58 and TFX were pushed all the way

through development despite mounting unfavorable evidence 9

The B-70 and

Skybolt were halted short of procurement, but long after the signals were
clear that they were bad ideas"

A considerable amount of "bunching"

of Rand D efforts into a few large projects, with considerable stickiness
in changing the list of projects or their internal strategy, probably is inherent
in technology forcing.

It has been argued elsewhere, however, that the extent

of these characteristics in military Rand D compounds the problems, as does
the "double control" system of private management and detailed public monitoring.
Our belief is that these aberrations will be applied with the big push philosophy,
making a naturally costly strategy even more costly.

It is a good bet that

Boeing would not have persisted so long in pushing its swing wing SST design
had the bulk of the funds been its own, and had it the ability to make that
decision on its owno

We think the signals are clear enough that the present

design is in trouble.

Only momentum and the awkwardness of changing the game

plan now carry the project forward in its present conception.

Similarly,

throughout the history of the AEC's power reactor program there have been
complaints that the AEC was persisting in Rand Don a design long after evidence
had accumulated that this was not an attractive route, and, conversely, that
the AEC has been very sticky about initiating work on new concepts.
If we were not in so much of a hurry we would feel less compelled to adopt
an institutional mode that not only is highly inefficient, but carries some
rather dangerous implications regarding the role of Government as a product
advocacy lobbyist.

It is rather surprising that the producers of coal and oil

and power generating equipment using conventional fuels have not raised
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more noise than they have regarding the pressure being applied to the utilities
by the AEC to install nuclear rather than conventional power.

While the evidence

on the nature of thermal pollution and nuclear waste problems now is far from
clear, and nuclear power still probably looks good compared to conventional
power in pollution and waste problems, we think we should feel some discomfort
that a strong government lobby has a stake in the issue.

There has been more

vocal concern about the implications of a governmental financial stake in the
SST, perhaps because of the explicit "revenue sharing" provisions in the program.
But even without a financial stake, the relevant government agencies, and the
higher executives and congressmen who support their program, have a personal
credibility stake in the success of the products and processes they push so
hard.

It is relatively clear that the success of the SST program, measured

in almost any dimension that has been talked about, will depend highly on the
fare structure allowed and encouraged by the CAB.

The CAB can go a long way

towards making the SST program a financial success, by fighting for high fares
(to cover the higher costs of the SST relative to the jumbo jets) and uniform
fares (so that the lower cost technology will not be able to compete in the
dimension where it is strongest).

This implication of the "big push" policies we

find very disturbing.
These programs are dangerous also in that they reinforce an already
strong tendency on the part of the nation to look to technological fixes as
the preferred way to deal with problems.

One consequence of the technology

fix cult, and it already is apparent in several areas, is an overstress on
Rand Din areas where other routes may strike more directly at the problem,
or be more efficient if less glamorous.

It is clear, for example, that

while Rand D can help improve our shelf of relevant technology for dealing
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with problems of urban congestion and pollution, there exists technology now
that can deal with many aspects of the problems, and what would do the most
good would be significant changes in incentives and costs facing congestors
and pollutors.

Indeed there is some reason to fear that the quest of an

Rand D fix may retard really dealing with the problems.

Present solutions

to congestion and pollution are politically fractionous.

The argument that

with Rand D we can have better solutions provides an excellent excuse for
avoiding ,_doing mqch nm,,.
We are advocates of more Governmental Rand D both in support of industrial
technology and on pressing social problems.

The kinds of programs that are

sensible, however, are those that recognize explicitly the uncertainties that
reside in far reaching Rand D and that avoid making large committments to
particular approaches prematurely.

There is a strong case for extending the

kinds of programs that characterized NACA during the twenties and thirties and
the AEC during the fifties to a general policy in support of applied research
and experimental engineering development.

A specific institutional format for

doing this has been suggested in another place.*

For Rand Don social

problems where public sector agencies are responsible for the provision of
the relevant good or service in many cases Federal Rand D support will have
to extend through final design, but here too it is important to avoid the style
of Defense and NASA.

We even see some merit in programs with the flair and

excitement (but we suspect very small economic or scientific payoffs) of Project
Apollo.

However, the recent evolution of the power reactor and SST programs

is movement in the wrong direction.

It is not clear whether the.se particular

programs can be turned off or cut back.

But it -4,s extremely important that

they not become precedents.
*Nelson, Peck, Kalachek, Chapter 8.

